ORIE Colloquium: Anne-Katrin Roesler (Toronto)

Location

Frank H. T. Rhodes Hall 253
or
https://cornell.zoom.us/j/828729415?pwd=dlZuREMzKzRvYnZRMVNRdEZaNE80QT09

Description

Multi-Dimensional Screening: Buyer-Optimal Learning and Informational Robustness

A monopolist seller of multiple goods screens a buyer whose type is initially unknown to both but drawn from a commonly known distribution. The buyer privately learns about his type via a signal. We derive the seller’s optimal mechanism in two different information environments. We begin by deriving the buyer-optimal outcome. Here, an information designer first selects a signal, and then the seller chooses an optimal mechanism in response; the designer’s objective is to maximize consumer surplus. Then, we derive the optimal informationally robust mechanism. In this case, the seller first chooses the mechanism, and then nature picks the signal that minimizes the seller’s profits. We derive the relation between both problems and show that the optimal mechanism in both cases takes the form of pure bundling.

This is joint work with Rahul Deb.

Bio:
Anne-Katrin Roesler is an assistant professor of economics at the University of Toronto. She is a microeconomic theorist, investigating topics in game theory, information economics, mechanism, and information design. Her research agenda focuses on better understanding the strategic aspects and impact of private learning, information acquisition, and disclosure in a wide range of settings, ranging from monopoly pricing to team collaboration and matching. She currently teaches advanced-level game theory and market design. Professor Roesler earned her Ph.D. in economics from the University of Bonn in 2015, after receiving her Diplom in mathematics with a minor in astronomy in 2010 from Bonn.